IMGpapers 1980–83

Newspapers of the International Marxist Group and its forerunners, 1980–83

Marxism and Social Democracy betrayals

Socialist Challenge No. 272, 3 December 1982 · p. 10 of the scan · 2,137 words

The scan: sc-no272.pdf (PDF, Marxists Internet Archive, opens at this page)

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page 10 of the scan

AS WE SAW in the last article, the German SPD combination of theoretical errors and the growth within the party and the trade unions of a massive bureaucracy became increasingly prey to reformist and social patriotic pressures. This evolution of the SPD was sealed by its reaction to the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914.

The SPD's delegates voted unanimously for war credits in support of the war. In a closed session of the SPD's Hasse and 12 others had opposed voting for the Wa OCOs Bur acMace L SAnE-1 party discipline — Hasse even reac out the SPD's declaration in support of the war credits. The international workers movement was stunned by the SPD's betrayal. Lenin refused to believe the news and told Zinovicy that the copy of the SPD's paper Vorwarts which contained the news was a forgery. Trotsky, more personally acquainted with the leaders of German Social Democracy was also shocked - but less so than Lenin:"Tdsd not expect the officiatlesders io hele name i cac le ore prove themselves capable serious revolutionarv mtiative At the same time I would not even adthe idea that the democracy would simply cower on DC!V ortore militarism has remained one of the tragic ex- the vote of 4 August periences of my life. (1)

The decision of the SPD Icadership to vote for the war credits was in defiance of every Socialist (Second) International. 1907 the International anti-war manifesto under from Lenin, Martov and Luxemburg:

*f war threatens to hrenk out it is the duty of the working class oi is paruamentary representative:

in the countries involved supportec by the consolidating activity International Bureau to exert every CTOT 0 brevetele euroreuk o war ... Should war break out never theless it is their duty to intervene in TAVOUE OTITE specay terminanon and to do all in their utilise the economic and political e ss conser omewart ousenr people's and thereby to hasten the abolition of capitalist class rule (2)

This was later filled out in the antiwar manifesto adopted in 1912. On reading the manifesto, declared: "They have given us a large promissory note: let us see how well they will mneet it'. In less than two vears benin got nis answer.

democratic leaders capable of immensely militant, leftsounding phrascs on the eve ot a crisis. But war and revolution inevitably test out the reformist leaders. German demonstrated, through this first great betrayal of the international socialist movement, that it was loyal, in the last instance, to its own bourgeoisie and not the international working class.

Lenin had failed to clearly see the character of the Kautsky-Bebet *centre in the party; even Trotsky did not understand its reformist degeneration thoroughiy Only Rosa Luxemburg and the SPD's left wing had after 1905 begun to grasp the gap between the 'orthodox' revolutionary speechifying and the SPD's reformist practice.

The social democracy tried to explain its actions through an old, argument often TESCE bureaucratic mES CAOeTS. had no choice but to go along with the 'backwardness" of the workers. Ditteman explained:

*The Party could not act otherwisc. It would arouse a storm of mn cignanon wnong ine men at the front and people back the SPD did it (ie vote against wat credits). The socialist organisation would be swept away by popular Right up until 4 August 1914 the German government nad taken the SPD's formal a-TeT seriousiy. It had thus prepared a long list of party and trade union leaders who were to be imprisoned in the event of war breaking out. But within days of the declaration of war these same leaders were granted immunity Socialist Challenge 3 December 1982 NEUORSIIET decision of the adopted an pressure power to Lenin are democracy that they maintain social peace. by the democratic that they engaged in patriotic Courier, Transport Workers Union:ine vilanous dishonourable, faithless Tsar and CHILELEL position ELO AUSTRA TIOODSH sunk. disillusionment set Karl Liebknecht speeks to workers in Berlin Workers demonstration, 9 November 1918. from military service on the grounds were urgently needed at fed. home to boost war production and The extent to which the social WWECAEE CCI hecame rabble rousing can be seen from the following quote the Dans ottn! bloody his allies, Britons, the boastfui French, tus pertidious lying Belgians, the thankless Boers, the swaggering Canadians, and the kidnapped Zouaves, Niggers and the remainIE SCU CUCIrA nave broker against the strong wall set up by the ed implacable heroism of the German Such were the depths to which the social democratic bureaucracy As the war dragged on, and CaHUHk the workers - over-worked and poorly When in May 1916 Liebknecht was imprisoned for his anti-war activities, 60,000 Berlin factory workers went on strike.

majority of the Berlin executive of the SPD supported the strike, and they were promptly expelled from the party. Ims neipco to create the nucleus for the formation of the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) in carly 1917, position to the pro-war policies of the SPD leadership. The SPD classically 'centrist" organisation, wavering between reformist revolutionary positions. It won the allegiance of a large minority of the full-time apparatus, and political Icaders as diverse Liebknecht and Luxemburg on the left, Kautsky and Bernstein on the right (their old differences forgotten) and a strong centre around Haase, Ditteman and Barth months after the split the against 150,000 of the official SPD Ahove all the USPD had a big majoriBerlin.

leaders too were forced into a series of left" manoeuvres in order to try to head off the workers. In January 1918 SPD leader Ebert came out in support of the antiwar strike, called by the workers to protest at the terms of the Brest Litovsk treaty. conditions against Russia in return for peace.

the labour bureaucracy was seen in action. tained its role by mediating berween the classes. In the last instance loyal to the bourgeois order, to maintain their own forced to move to the left with the masses → but always with the aim of preventing the mass movement from adopting which would have destroyed their own position.

On 3 October the newly installed Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, initiated moves for a negotiated peace with the allies.

immediately patriotic tune: Enough of death; not one more man must fall". day negotiations began for the inclusion of the SPD in the government. For the bourgcoisic, this was infinitely preferable to revolution.

in order that could be successfully however the social democrats insisted that the Kaiser would have to abdicate. As Ebert told Prince Max on 7 November, unless the abdication of the Kaiser were made known to the workers that very evening the whole lot will desert to the independent' (the USPD).

At the beginning of November, in a final attempt to create a better relationship of forces for negotiations, the ordered to sea. knowing the war to be lost, mutinied. A mass meeting of 20,000 elected a sailors' council. councis sprung up all along the coast On 5 November a demonstration of 40,000 In Hamburg voted "republic of workers councils" look power in the town. The German revolution had begun.

in the next councils were established throughout Germany.

Kaisers's abdication was announced SPD leader Ebert was proclaimed ImTEE EE Chancellor. neightened the workers expectations Thousands of workers in Berlin took to the streets believing that at last the socialist republic was at hand.

Learning that about to proclaim the republic at a mass meeting outside palace, Scheidemann, one of the two or three top SPD leaders declared to a mass meeting outside the Reichstag: The workers have won all along the line SOVCELOCT declared: "The government created by the revolution, the policy of which is purely socialist, is setting itself the task of implementing a socialist programme." But such talk was demagogic manoeuvre, preventing the workers going over to the USPD.

On the evening of the declaration of the republic Ebert made a secret Karl phone call to the German high command in the form of General Groner. They made an agreement: the army would remain loyal to the government provided that Ebert cooperated in crushing anarchy and Bolshevism While proclaiming ere poling he were plotting thousands of in op- revolutionary leaders The government formed out of was a these revolutionary beginning of November consisted of and three members each from the USPD and the SPD. Liebknecht refused to the government includ- would not be as revolutionary majority'. This was obviously a characterisation not only of Ebert and sencidemann, oul at icas of some of the leaders of his own party, the centrist USPD The bourgeoisie had secured an important victory agreement tionaries.

But the SPD Wing restlessness the of the factories which imposed punitive revolutionary Commissars Once again the perfidious role of base The SPD bureaucracy maintorce parlamentary position the bureaucrats were positions, Vorwarts, the SPD changed workers The next parlamentary this manoeuvre carried out and die.

December 1918. present OIESLICE German fleet was The sailors in Kiel, takist admit them.

Workers and sailors for a - and Wing address, days workers 9 November the the convening But this only assembly.

characteristically tuent assembly, Liebknecht was 344 against the royal A SPD pure aimed revolutionary clearly muss they are ystem. (E the socialist in private they small minority.

murder of there workers and their the vascillating events at the amount because he 'prisoner of a nonthrough revolution.

crush the revoluThey secured another im POIATL AE CCICHE the trade unions on 15 November, the "WorkAlliance agreement, which granted the workers important con cessions but recognised implicitly the right of the bosses to keep ownership The joint SPD-USPD government called itself the Council of Peoples - and this a government the leadership of Ebert and Scheidemann! The decisive thing now was whether this government would itself on mushrooming workers councils or whether it would movement DACK into channels. Naturally Ebert and Scheidemann were opposed root and branch to a govertiment based on the councils — which in efTect would have meant the destruction of the bourgeois state and the creation of a workers state Now the SPD leaders carried out the most daring and destructive of counter-revolutionary manoeuvres Everywhere the SPD had gone into the workers councils, and in many places were in the leadership. Many clearly did not grasp the political differences between the SPD and the USPD. The SPD now fought creation of a constituent assembly — in effect a parliament. They argued the necessity to combine power with the existence of workers councils - knowing full well that once a parliament was in place, and the bourgeois army still intact, the councils would wither The crucial turning point was the First Congress of the Workers and Soldiers Councils held in Berlin on 30 448 delegates were 289 from the SPD (60 pcr cent), 90 from the USPD (20 per cent) other groups 25 (5 per cent). Only ten of the USPD belonged to the revolutionary Spartakist faction. The Sparleaders were not elected as delegates and the congress refused to The choice facing the congress was clear. Two resolutions summed it up. The first called for elections to a constituent assembly on 19 January 1919. The second for all power to the workcts councus. coct, 10 mis oper carefully confused the issue by calling for the new socialist state to be based on a *firm foundation" to 'achieve its socialist goals" The SPD delegation voted solidly for of a constituent But the USPD delegation confused. The voting — 400 for convening a constiwith 50 against; 98 for all power to the workers councils showed SERAL delegates, most from the USPD, had voted for both resolutions!

revolutionary opportunity which if grasped would have changed the face of European and politics, was thrown away by the social democratic traitors Ernest Daumig. a leader of the USPD and later a leader of the Com munis. Party summed it up in his ad. dress to the conference:

When the history of these weeks WTELLCT DODe Wi sHie anosawer they so blind as not to see that they vere putting ropes round their owi anVOnC WRO ank perceive approval of the National Assembly is cqmvalent to a deali sentence of the system of which now a part, the council RR ECU ORAne SNIRBOAU that the Spartakists were in such a Although of course thousands of TEVOLT tionaries in the USPD, the majority leadership was weak anc But Luxemburg and Liebknecht had only a few thousand organised supporters.

In a revolutionary situation no revolutionary acumen makes up for lack of numbers. The ten Spartakists at the December con ference were swamped by the solid phalanx of Ebert's supporters.

In tour years the reformist leaders had gone from being super patriots to commisars". But always with the intention of strangling the

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