Democratic Party Afghanistan (PDPA) overturnea the Daud regime and took power in Initially the PDPA regime received a favourable judgement from sectors of the masses.
In 12 months this support been frittered away.
The programme of the regime comprised a series of halt-measures applied in a way that was quite incapable of breaking the hold of ruling layers on the rura masses.
The PDPA made no effort to raise the level of consciousness the and kept well Dcasalits. away from organising mobilising the workers and poor peasants in an independent way. It In SITUmovement and outlawed strikes.
April 1978 the big landowners, the tribal chiefs whO were oni recently made legal owners of the land, the mullahs and the fundamentalist Pushtuns armed struggle against the In spite of their base of support, these reactionary leaders were engaged in a struggle reforms ally order to safeguard their position as exploiters and oppressors. this point of view, even though the PDPA base was limited it was opposed tc the reactionary camp in a In 1979 movements inside the national and minorities in Hazardjah, Tadjikistan and Nuristan appeared.
Above all they expressed opposition to the central state and to a PDPA which was identified with traditional Patin 0oma tion.
Thus the PDPA was incapable of implementing its programme The growing resistance of the rural population and part urban masses, well as the appearance of splits in ide the Afghan army, all heightened the isolation of the regime.
Soviet intervenuon became heavier after the Herat (March LD SES 1 Jalalabad and especially the mutiny at the Bala-hissar fort (near Socialist Challenge Kabul) in August 1979. This resulted in repeated COnICLS OCLWCCIl Kremlin advisors and some PDPA elements.
fact stands out very clearly from all the evidence: the intervention, occupation, and the policy followed since September 1979, were all decided by Moscow, nol by the Afghan government.
The Soviet bureaucracy has shown that, in order to follow its own objectives does hesitate to refuse grain of rights to self-determination of the peoples of this semi-colonial country. There no doubt that there was a violation of self-determination. Furthermore, the point view •eneral particular interests of he revoluTion suen an orientaton cannot be justified.
Nor can the military occupation be justified in the name of the detence ot the USSR. At no time during ine class conrucis in Afghanistan - which certainly could have resulted in the fall of the PDPA was there any possibility of forces coming to power in Atghanis tan capable of attacking the USSR, or of a generalised conflict developing which could threaten thi social foundations of the USSR. U S Kunduz KABULO 'Red Army' forces could and cannot, become the instrument tor ar effective battle against the This is even 1 cartivialico. more the case given the battle cannot be won only militarily.
Far welding mination is one of the absolutely elements of anv for struggle against reac and imperialism Afghanistan region as a whole.
To organise the battle necessary base Dar avers wo are mos open to support for policv of democratic re forms and social changes.
WILlIOul ailanci with the poor peasantry oppressed Hationala dead end will be reached.
In Afghanistan today two aspects of national self-determination are combined: the hand the defence of political sovereignty and independence laced will the Soviet occupation, and other hand the rights and aspirations of oppressed national mino rities in the framework of the Afghan state and of the region as a whole It would be false to reject this approach by counterposing, ple, the right to 'self•ererauauou of the workers in the towns and countryside, on the pretext of the backward character of sectors tance. Putting forward such a slogan simply ends up denying the effect pro voked by the Soviet intervention class consciousness in Afghanistan.
To win an influence among the urban working masses and to their control by the reac tionary forces it is vital to put torward democrati and social demands, to detend their and take a position against the hold of the USSR. Such an approach can also provide answer those who supported the regime and progressive measures (despite the way in waca unev were carnicu out) but who are splitting from it and retuse to back the policy of the USSR.
A clear position of the Internanona workers movement against imperand for the right of self-determination in Aignan istan permits the weakenIslamic tun. damentalist forces, who are beginning to be discredited for their methods, and favours the organisa tions struggling masses and tional rights.
A withdrawal of Soviet troops would doublessly put into danger the partisans or une exsuneredat The Kremlin's policy will contributed their position against the reactionaries But this can only be seen relation the overall negative effects of the maintenance of Soviet troops for the development of the class struggle on the national and international level.
Soviet troop withdrawal does not imply dropping defence of PDPA militants and sympathisers sulalley against the reactionaries Socialists should the confuse the principle internationalism and effective aid to freedom-fighters in a deve loping revolution, with the military intervention workers falsel presented as an 'extension have ot socialism'. which in tac prevents any independent activity of the masses.
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THE following is an abridged version of a resolution on Afghanistan adopt- ed by majority at a recent meeting of the International Executive Commit- tee of the Fourth International. Democrat Pare les