TWO YEARS ago the magazine, which has the ear of most bankers and industrialists this country. echoed many of them thought about Edwardes' Plan for British Leyland.
The article savs this• it close Leyland now, there will be an outcry. So let's do it slowly.
'At least' reckon many cabinet ministers' concluded, the Edwardes Plan mean that Tory government cannot be accused of having acted evematicall has when BL eventually to be two would years' time after another say.
bout of industrial disruption'.
In other words, when the time is ripe we can blame the workforce, and shut the whole thing But who is really to blame BL's present state! Ine workorce de the traditional scapegoats.
Yet BL's labour costs of Toyota and under half worker are two-titths of Daimler-Benz: And the number of vehicles produced by each Bi worke - 8.7 in 1976- compares favourably Ford Will UK's 5.6 and Vauxhall's 6.8.
different story emerges when we look at the bosses' side: above all the history of BL before and after nationalisation.
Because the root cause of BL's decline is chronic underinvestment.
By 1978 BL's assets totalled £5375 employee, while Ford Uf had £9450 and Toyota a staggering £150,000. Yet in the six years between the BLMC through merger of major British car companies, and nationalisation, the doled U Ul £70 million in dividends and £61 million in interest payments. Profits During the nationalisation process a special committee under Lord Ryder investigated the company.
They reported:
'Profits tax throughout 1968-74 have been inadequate ... despite this low level of profits BL has over the period distributed nearly all of them as dividends.' How did management gel away with it? Firstly, they failed to allow properly depreciation This meant that they could declare, as profits, money ing the lesson of the mass meeting: those who wanthad been allowing the 'cut and run' minority to make the running.
People must get stuck into the debate with these elements, who are being used by. the supervisors to Raise the prospect of offering all extra 6-8 weeks redundanposition point to the 13.6 cy pay to buy off the UCI rate.
Challenge the pany to open the books and make much of the fact that Michael Edwardes has debate his plan to 'save' Rover.
Wednesday Meeting with management in morning where we attack them quesnon of overtime. Edwardes: uses the workforce as scapegoats which should rightfully have been used to modernise old equipment.
Ryder pointed out the cupation against redundiscussion on at ae will dancies, and starts need to do to fight the closure when it comes to the crunch.
Agree need for mass miccung Immedlalely alle.
6 July national conference and begin the preparation for a fight.
In the afternoon I am quietly tipped member of management to results in a detailed table showing that by 1975, in all maustry wnere normal turnround for plant eight years, over two thirds BL's equipment was older than eight years, and over a thira more than twelve years old Second, they decreased their working capital by around £100 million. They started paying their creOTTOTS and gelling their debtors to pay them amount money were holding in the bank fits.
Claim Then the government stepped in. But no penalty was imposed for what the owners had done.
In the first two years of nationalisation alone over £80 million went in interest payments.
What would happen if BL was closed? Surprise, ECONOMIC STRATEGY surprise, first claim would be exercised by the loan stockholders. According to the Economist, closing BL would mean handing over £170 million to those parasites.
Net result? private ownership BL worker made £1,000 to Dosses pockets while BL investment went down the drain Under nationalisation, these same bosses take a foots the bill for their greed and incompetence. And when BL folds?
The taxpayers hand these same bosses nearly a quarter of a billion pounds for the inconvenience Edwards calls it viability. We have another term BLOODY ROBBERY! DAILIUNI
----- pull-quotes -----
announced that the SD1 Solihull was to be been started by militants PAT HICKEY continues