IMGpapers 1980–83

Newspapers of the International Marxist Group and its forerunners, 1980–83

Guerrillas hold regime at bay

· Socialist Challenge No. 193, 16 April 1981 · p. 12 of the scan · 568 words

The scan: sc-n193-apr-16-1981.pdf (PDF, Marxists Internet Archive, opens at this page)

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page 12 of the scan

El Salvador — on the scene report SINCE the left-wing power in sive against the right-wing dictatorship on 10 counter-claims •soul struggle.

Duarte, tries to back up situation is being 'normalised' by saying that 'for the past year the streets of this city have C nOST been streets are full of people shopping Duarte neglects to menton that due to the curfew everyone has to do their shopping during the same few hours.

But Duarte's claim has been pickea up Dy the intenational press. Is it true, Duarte claims, that the political situation is beginning to stabilise?

true people say including acting Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas - Inat the junta has been gaining support and the guerrillas losing since the beginning of the guerrilla offensive 10 Januarv?

Was the offensive a big military defeat the revolutionary forces?

Messages These points are constantly repeated in all the mass media in Salvador.

radio, and television are InGeT government control. The coveruel Has evel torbidden privately-owned radio stations trom broadcasting the popular teatures in which listeners send each other Lall hicosazes The prohibition was just the could Loilalll coded secrets for the revolutionaries. It was also due to the fact that people might learn of the real situation in the country.

We should not underenze dee ee on koe intensive propaganda on especially lic populatloll. since the possibilities for countering it are limited. The opposition's clandestine radio stations Radio Venceremos and Radio Liberacion — are difficult to pick up.

Circulating acred ther oen- fighting for winiling The head of the military junta, Napoleon claim that the empty. But now the on a one-to-one basis. The circulation of the revolutonary press is too small Be cCuvev COULLCI government propaganda. Untrue There has also been a certain amount of fatigue among Ine population After two years of intense repression there hopes that the offensive would bring a quick end to Lne wal Revolutionary Army (ERP) Commander Alejandro Montenegro told me that SOnIC segments Un e population, especially the bourgeolsle. have been frustrated that the 10 January offensive did not achieve a quick solution and are therefore more prone to accept the government propaganda.

But considering the LyCrACHL monopoly over the news media, it is SUDOSY LO sce now ew people actually believe the The government's false claims that they have made Sagdend millary a0 -vances are obviously unalu alc vine effects on the morale their own troops.

The troops also know Left wing guerrillas in action in San Salvador troops to revoll against tne junta, 200 soldiers, willl direct •OnuCal contact with the revoluLollar y g. vups, followed him.

The rest of the garrison simply melted away, fleeing to their homes, leaving the country, or going into hiding. government.

All these factors indicate there no substance Duarte's claim that the situation in has become more stable since the offensive.

In fact, what the offensive mainly showed is that the Salvadoran junta totally dependent on US The biggest weakness of the 10 January offensive was the fact that with CCXCDUO Santa Ana, where the offensive took the character of insurrectionary struggle, the offensive as a whole was almost exclusively restricted military operations.

There several WCIO reasons why the call for a general strike did not get a massive response. There problems WCIe COOL. dination and an wnucresumaton strength of the enemy's repressive apparatus.

In addition, the planning of the offensive was

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