The Carter administration has gracuany sacicascu US political, diplomatic, and mintary volvement in support of the civilian-military coalition This involvement is extensive growing. résources invested in this effort exceed those allocated to any other hemispheric CrIsIs since 1965.
Resource allocation and public statements have idenCentral America and the Caribbean with the late ot a relatively weak, unpopular internationally isolated revealed the existence of a Savlador the regime. of to *Setting up adequate supply material in cooperation with and hemispheric allies. *Providing strategic and tactical command assistance. *Increasing cohesion and o valius command structures Salvadoran armed forces.
*Seeking to for unified command the military units operating in the country. in- *Establishing and/or im• cooperation among forces and organizations in Guatemala, A FORTNIGHT ago the media in the United States 'dissent paper' on El Salvador, written by members of the State Department and other government agencies.
The dissidents argued that the present drift of United States policy towards El Salvador will lead to military in tervention, and that a now, more conciliatory course is In presenting these views the authors of the document make a full exposé of the role of the United States in E that of covert material and moral support for El Salvador and Honduras. stockpiling Updating detailed contingency alternative responses to deterioration of condiadvisory tions in the region to include:
within *Political and diplomatic initiatives to be taken in the event that military ment of US forces is required bring under preserve para*Operational multilateral and deployment of military forces in El armed mala. paramilitary *Cost, casualty estimates under tually be adopted.
paper, The Militant. and scenarios. plans for. US undertaken.
lines of engage This current plans for resources unilateral made Salvador and Guateand time favourable They maintain that direct military intervention by the United States would cause immense political problems and would probably not be supported by public opinion in the US: 'An October 1980 poll found that 60 per cent of all males and 68 per cent of females interviewed opposed the use of military force in developing countries.
The election of Ronald Reagan makes it unlikely that the 'moderate' course advocated in this document will acsight into just what the United States is up to. corpts published here are from the American Trotskyist unfavourable conflict *Evaluation of readiness status and recommendations Simply on preparatory exercises lo dc we interpret it, *Assessment of the neec and preparation of contingency plans for actions intended the to disrupt support and supply Salvadoran guerrilla aile partial list of activities implies an allocation of bureaucratic and financial El situation exceeding any other hemispheric crisis since 1965.
No such allocation could have taken place without a majo their high level decision in the ad*The and Nonetheless it gives a fascinating inThe exto Assessment We consider these activities and the policies they to be dangerously misguided. Current policy, , is based on inaccurate intelligence, and or suppression within bureaucracies of verified contradicting inforSalvador's domestic *The governing Junta and 'the armed forces have failed to rally significant support for reform and counterinsurgency programs land redistribution the peasant population and has not succeeded in isolating guerrilla forces *The urban middle class is divided among those who have already chosen to side the FDR neutral for the me being neutral the time being. Only a small fraction of this sector can be said to be committed to the survival of the „current regime.
*The documented expansion of military capabilities of opposition forces, inclucing unel abinty to recrul organize large condisplaced peasants, and to cause heavy TATTITTAN STOP COMPEND forces, makes it highly unlikeiv that a short tern military defeat of the guerrilla forces might be achieved.
"Neer me over nor the armed forces have been aDIe demonstri their will or ability to avoid indiscriminate repression civilian personnel thus contributing the rapid deterioration of their image among the population and internationally.
We believe that this support would not survive the introduction of US troops in the region. an Uc tober 1980 poll found that 60 per cent of all males and 68 viewed opposed the use of Us cent females intermilitary force in trouble spots in developing countries. Our proposals Signal Our Willingness Abandon the Confrontational Track Salvadoran and interna tional public opinion perceive the US as being committed to a military solution in Central America. We must signal our willingness to abandon thi course of action under certain conditions, without necessarily closing that option. To do so we must consider:
1) Taking actions which will clearly separate us from those sectors in and out of the armed forces responsible for gross excesse: against the population. The individuals involved have been identified by the FDR/DRU and by our own intelligence services 2) Taking actions that indicate. willingness to reduce the level of military support we are providing to the armed forces, for example by reducing or interrupting our training program and supply flows 3) Condemning the in. tervention plans of Guatemalan military and paramilitary forces, dicating • Ol opposition Honduran support for hostile actions against Nicaragua 4) Expressing privately and publicly OUl concern regarding Southern Cone countries' involvement in E Salvador. urge allies, including Israel, to aci with caution in the region.