have been urged to do the same. Washington's outrage is understandable. The move by the Soviet rulers came in reaction to increasing military activity, over the past year, by rightist guerrillas determined to roll back the land reform & other social gains that had been initiated after the 1978 April revolution. From the outset, these forces had been organised, financed and equipped by Washington and its allies, most notably the Pakistan military dictatorship.
The Soviet and Afgan offensive to defeat the rightist bands is, in this sense, a major set-back for Washington's manoeuvres, not only in Afghanistan but in neighbouring Iran as well. It is a sharp blow to their efforts to hold back the revolutionary upsurge in the area.
UPSURGE Despite Washington's hypocritical propaganda, the entry of Soviet troops took place against a rising upsurge of the Afghanistan people for social change that can be traced back to 1978. The seizure of power in that year by the P.D.P.A (the Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan) was not a "coup", as the Western press would have us believe, but the culmination of a series of mass uprisings in the streets of Kabul.
Ironically enough, the events of 1978 were precipitated, in part, by Washington itself. In response During the last days of December, Soviet troops poured into Afghanistan The reaction by Western governments was hysterical. Denouncing it as an attempt to "subjugate an independent Islamic people", Washington has curtailed trade and diplomatic links with Moscow. Its "allies" to inducements from the USA and the Shah of Iran, the capitalist regime of Mohammad Daud, that originally had economic ties with Moscow, shifted towards a more 'openly pro--imperialist stance. As part of this shift, Daud cracked down heavily on the PDPA, a pro-Moscow Stalinist Party.
On April Ist, 1978, Mir Abkar Khyber, a prominant leader of the PDPA, was assassinated. This spark ed off an immediate popular response which led to mass actions against the government. Against the background of mass upsurge, PDPA militants and supporters in the military deposed Daud and seized power.
REFORM All the posts in the government were held by PDPA members and Taraki became president. On May 9th, he described the armed uprising as the beginning of a "democratic and national revolution". He outlined a 30-point programme of democratic and social reforms aimed at breaking the power of the landlords and improving the lot of Afghanistan's workers and peasants which began to be put into effect. These included: * cancelling the debts of poor peasants. * implementing land reform by setting a ceiling on ownership ot about 1s acres * legalising trade unions for the declaring primary schooling as compulsory and offering special courses to married women.
but the social measures it tried to introduce won it greater popularity. At least until mid-1979, demonstrations in support of the government were held on almost a daily basis, drawing as many as 150,000 people.
WASHINGTON the Kremlin could not ignore it.
important, Moscow began to give it considerable assistance. Some 40 new economic aid agreements the number of Soviet military & civilian advisers rose to several thousands.
It was not Moscow's increased influence in Afganistan that alarmed Washington, however, but the Afghan revolution itself and its repercussions in Central workers and peasants and feared that the revolution might lead to an overthrow of capitalist property relations. This fear was fed by the revolutionary outburst in Iran only shortly later.
that Washington began to back those forces in Afganistan who were themselves opposed to the Kabul government. Dispossessed monarchists, usurers, smugglers and opium dealers began to be organised into guerrilla bands to oppose the land reform, the literacy drive and other measures. Some groups, like the Hezb-i the monarchy which had been Others, like the Jamiat-i Islami, ani circles. Some of them fought When the PDPA seized power, it had only a limited base of support.
DIVISIONS The Soviet government had no ties with the Afgan revolution, but Since Afganistan was strategically had been signed by late 1978 and Asia. Washington was opposed to the social gains won by the Afghan It was to curb this development progressive measures taken by the landlords, former military officers, Islami favoured the restoration of overthrown by Daud in late 1973.
had close toes with rightist Pakist"repressive". When Moscow gave some assistance to the Afgan government, Carter warned them against "interference".
With such backing, these groups stepped up their activities in many parts of Afganistan, destroying bridges and schools, murdering PDPA members and seeking to create so much insecurity that the government would be unable to carry through its reforms.
Although the guerrillas' claims to success were exagerated, they did cause severe disruption and damage, and wore down the morale of the Afgan army. The Afghan government managed to hang on to the cities, but their ability to carry through a struggle against the guerrillas in the countryside was hampered in two ways.
First, factional conflicts inside the PDPA emerged. As early as July 1978, one faction in the party - led by Karmal and known as the Parcham - was purged. The victorious faction, known as the Khalq, was itself rent by divisions. It was through these factional infights that in September 1979. President Taraki was removed & Hafizullah Amin seized power.
Secondly. it also appears that some of the regime's reforms were implemented in a bureaucratic manner, without any serious attempt to organise, educate and mobilise the masses, particulariy in the countryside. This gave the reactionary guerrilla groups real chances for exploitation which they naturally seized.
Both Taraki and Amin repeatedly requested Soviet military aid to combat the guerrilla forces. Some was provided but. as the Izvestia Jan Ist admitted, Moscow hesitated in the hope that the rebellion would itself lose momentum.
This attitude changed, however, in response to Washington's manoeuvres in regard to Iran. When Carter began to threaten military agression agalist lan - and lo prepare to "bolster' his military position in the Indian Ocean and Persian gulf - Moscow feared that the escalation of rightist guerrilla activity could result in the weak Afgan regime being overthrown. It was this that prompted the Soviet decision to act. As Izvestia pointed out Jan Ist, Moscow was not going to allow a "neighbouring country" to be "turned into a base for the preparation of imp. erialist agression against the Soviet Union".
In the process of sending in Soviet troops to deal with the rightist guerrillas, Moscow at the same time backed the overthrow and execution of Amin, in whom they had little confidence. As the Kremlin bureaucrats often do with ousted Soviet officials. Amin was made a "scapegoat" for past failures Karmal, whom Moscow gambled would be more reliable, was returned from exile in E. Europe and became the new President. He reinstalled a number of previously purged Parcham faction leaders.
US - HANDS OFF!
Washington would undoubtedly like to do more than scream in outrage to stop the Soviet drive and contain the Atghan revolution. They have been limited, however, by their growing political weakness since their major defeat in Vietnam. This has been shown in their inability to openly intervene in the mounting struggles in Iran, Grenada, Nicaragua and Ethiopia.
This does not mean, however, that their 'threats' of military action should be taken lightly or that their continued support for right-wing guerrilla bands cannot seriously damage or hold back the Afghan revolution While the Soviet move will do much to break the rightist opposition, the only sure way to defeat it is to back up military action by social measures to advance that revolution. New social measures and the organisation of workers and peasants to support them is the only sure way of blocking Carter's ambitions.
We, in the West, can play our part too by exposing the sheer hypocrisy of Carter's so-called defence of 'democratic rights' and demanding: US - Hands off Afghanistan By P. Henning